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LANGUAGE AS "ALWAYS ALREADY" METAPHOR: THE PRIMACY
OF WRITING IN VICO, DERRIDA, AND SAID
Sante Matteo
Brigham Young University
Edward Said ends his book of literary criticism and theory, Beginnings,
with a lengthy chapter devoted to the eighteenth-century Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico. The choice is especially telling since it
follows the widely anthologized and very influential chapter, "Abaca=:
d ar1 urn Cu 1tu rae: Absence, Wri ti ng, Statement, Di scourse, Archeology.
Structuralism," devoted to an assessment of contemporary literary theory,
including French structuralism and post-structuralism, and the works of
Barthes, L~vi-Strauss, Foucault and Derrida. Why choose to end such a
current study of beginnings, which wants itself to be a beginning of a
new approach to literary inquiry, with a backward leap to the eighteenth
century? Said explains:
All of Vico's great book [The New Science] is an effort to give
substance to the otherwise banished beginnings of human
reality. Yet every time he describes man's beginning, Vico
drastically qualifies his characterization with something like
"we cannot at all imagine and can comprehend only with great
effort •••• " Thus not only is it hard for modern man to locate
his beginning, but even when he becomes aware of his his~ Jrica1
aborigina1ity he cannot even truly imagine what it is.
Vico's place at the conclusion of a book on beginnings is
earned by preci se1y thi s truth, as well as by the attitude
toward scholarship it entails. So far as I have been able to
discover, Vico is the prototypical modern thinker who, as we
shall presently see, perceives beginning as an activity
requiring the writer to maintain an unstraying obligation to
practical reality and sympathetic imagination in equally strong
parts •••• (348-349)
A few pages later he enumerates those notions he has found useful in
Vico's work. Allow me to quote the passage in its entirety:
Vico's thought, as I have so far described it, is extraordinarily useful at this stage in that it parallels my key
arguments throughout the preceding five chapters. Here is a
schematic list of seven Vichian signposts that have helped me,
from the beginning, to discuss beginnings and to sketch a
method:
The initial distinction between the gentile or historical
a.
and the sacred or origina1--paralle1ing my distinction
between beginning and an origin.
b.
The combination in intellectual work of a special,
idiosyncratic problem and a very strong interest in human
co11ectivity--a combination that occurs in this text from
the beginning.
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c.

d.
e.
f.
g.

An acute awareness not only of genealogical succession
(except as its biological foundations obviously persist),
but also of parallelism, adjacency, and complementarity-that is, all those rel ati onsh i ps that emphas i ze the
lateral and the dispersed rather than the linear and the
sequential.
A central interpl ay between begi nni ng and repetition, or
between beginning and beginning-again.
Language as rewriting, as history conditioned by repetition, as encipherment and dissemination--the instability,
and the richness, of a text as practice and as idea.
Topics for critical analysis that do not fall neatly into
the categories of commentary, chronicle, or thematic
tracings.
The beginning of writing as inaugurating and subsequently
maintaining another order of meaning from previous or
already existing writing. Here, once again, the distinction (made in a, above) between gentile and sacred becomes
rel evant. (357)

These statements are probably sybilline for anyone who is not familiar
with either Said's or Vico's books. By attempting to elucidate them I
can perhaps best give an account of Vico's thought, or at least those of
his ideas which seem to anticipate the notions proposed by today's
deconstructionists, and more specifically some of the formulations of the
contemporary French philosopher Jacques Derri da, the fathe; and chi ef
spokesman of Deconstruction.
Here again is Said's first point: "The initial distinction between the
gentile or historical and the sacred or original--paralleling my [Said's]
distinction between beginning and origin." The full title of the first
edition of Vico's New Science was The principles of a new science of the
nature of nations leading to the discovery of the principles of a new
system of the natu ra] 1 aw of the gentes.
In the second and thi rd
editions he gave up the search for natural laws, considering them too
abstract and ahistorical. His title was abbreviated to Principles of a
new science concerning the common nature of nations. His aim is to give
an account of the history of all nations at all times, an "ideal eternal
history," but with an important qualification:
this "ideal eternal
history" applies only to gentile nations or gentes (peoples). The
history of the chosen people, the Hebrews and then the Christians, was
different, he says, because it was dictated or written directly by God.
In the history of all other peoples divine providence worked and works
much more obliquely, allowing, or perhaps forcing, men to create their
own history, their own culture. Thus gentile history is man-made while
that of the chosen people has a direct divine origin.
Said says that the notion of gentile history posited by Vico is similar
to his notion of beginning; while the notion of sacred.history is similar
to the notion of origin which he wants to discard and replace with the
more dynamic concept of beginning. The origin would be the ultimate
cause or authority of a discourse or text, the generating matrix, the
foundation or grounding at the very root, beyond which there would be
nothing. Along with many other modern literary theorists, Said rejects
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the possibility or the desirability of ever reaching such an origin.
What we have instead in literature, and in culture in general, are
ever-new beginnings, which are reiterations, reformulations of previous
discourses, with no retrievable point of origin. Any discourse (or text,
or language, or history) can only be a reelaboration of previous discourses, texts, etc., a repetition with a difference, in the words of
Paul DeMan. Hence the formula "always already" which is on the lips and
on the tips of the pens of all the deconstructionists these days--or the
"deconites" as Wayne Booth has dubbed them.
Language and hi story can
exist only insofar as they have "always al ready" ex1sted, only as
im1tat10n and differentiation 1n an already exist1ng system.
In Sa1d's reading of Vico, the notion of sacred history is introduced
only to explain and validate the contrary notion of gentl1e history,
which, he says, is the only history treated in The New Science and the
only history that pertains to us. Thus we are not to see divine history
a~ a real possibility so much as a desire, a nostalgia for origin, which
activates and fuel s the mechani sm of gentl1 e hi story which is reiteration.
It's very possible that this dismissal of d1vine history 1s to be
attributed to Sa1d rather than to Vico himself, whose relig10s1ty remains
a very thorny issue. Throughout his book Vico insists on the central
role of prov1dence and divine will in all h1story. However, humanist or
mater1alist readers see such protestations as mere expedients to placate
the still-active inquisition of his time: Vico was merely paying lip
service to conventional religious ideas which actually played no role in
his "new science." Animistic readers, on the other hand, say that it's
arbitrary to dismiss something on which Vico seems to insist so much; and
that providence does indeed playa central role in his scheme. How could
Vico claim, for example, that history for all nations is a recurring
series of cycles or stages, always the same and in the same sequence, if
there were no providential master plan; if it were simply up to men to
create their own history?
This is one of many paradoxes one finds in Vico, paradoxes which are not
easily resolved, which perhaps cannot be resolved at all; and possibly
paradoxes which make Vico such a vital figure today, the object of so
many readings, approaches, juxtapositions, and interpretations. The
bibliography on Vico in the last decade has been phenomenal. He has been
posited as the precursor of every conceivable movement and of a wide
array of thinkers and writers, from Marx to Nietzche to Joyce.
But that's a wider problem, beyond the scope of this investig'ltion.
Let's go back to Said's list. The second Vichian signpost was "the
combination in intellectual work of a special idiosyncratic problem and a
very strong interest in human collectivity." The idiosyncratic nature of
Vico's project was in the consciousness he had of establishing a new
science which relied neither on material determinism nor on Platonic
universals as points of departure and in his unorthodox procedure which
relied on the study of myths and language, on far-fetched etymologies and
puns, on a view of 1 anguage as the repository of the definitions of
meanings from past states of cultural consciousness. Vico's concern with
"human coll ectivity" is mani fested in hi s i nsi stence on studyi ng the
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nature and behavior of nations or peoples, not individuals. When he
speaks of the poetic faculty, he does not refer to individual poets, but
to the cultural consciousness of an entire people during the second cycle
of the "ideal eternal history," which consists of the divine or primitive
stage when consciousness is controlled by the senses, the poetic or
heroic stage when consciousness is defined by imagination, and finally
the human or philosophic stage when consciousness is shaped by reason and
abstract thoughts, after all of which there is a "ricorso," a period of
decadence and return to the first stage. In any case, poetic wisdom and
reflective wisdom are collective properties characterizing an entire
society. In his search for the "True Homer" in the New Science, Vico
concludes that Homer was the whole of the Greek people during thei r
heroic age.
This emphasis on the "human collective" is probably more important to
Said than it would be to either the Structuralists or Deconstructionists
because his theoretical project is far more engag~, socially and politically, than theirs. Still, it's not just political commitment which is
at stake in this dichotomy between the personal or idiosyncratic and the
collective. There is also an adumbration of the Saussurean dichotomy
langue/parole, language as a system and as individual speech acts. By
his insistence on the collective nature of language and consciousness,
Vico seems to anticipate the structural paradigm elaborated by Ferdinand
de Saussure in linguistics and Claude L~vi-Strauss in anthropology and
mythology: where signification does not inhere in the relationship
between subject and object, but in the interplay of elemen~ s and functions within a system, or structure--the langue, which is . . . here before
and above and oblivious to the individual, even if it can be realized or
manifested only through the utterances of individuals.
Though Derrida and Deconstructionists undermine or explode the notion of
structures which they find too static, their deconstructive play in a
field of floating signifiers still relies on a systemic notion of
language based on differences and similarities. The subject is still
emarginated. And yet, just as in Vico, despite this denial of the
centrality of the subject, the discourse of Fr'ench post-structuralists
and deconstructionists, of Foucault and Derrida, and their American
disciples, such as Hartman and Hillis-Miller and the other so-called Yale
critics, tends to be very personal, idiosyncratic, and subjective. In
both Vico and Derrida we seem to have a parole which both acknowledges
and at the same time refuses its subjugation to 1angue; that is, to a
system beyond its control, but not beyond its kami k aze attempts at
sabotage--what Said calls idiosyncratic discourse and what Derrida calls
deconstruction.
The third point Said draws from Vico is a corollary to the second. "An
acute awareness not only of genealogical succession • • • but also of
parallelism, adjacency, and complementarity--that is, all those relationships that emphasize the lateral and the dispersed rather than the linear
and the sequenti al." Vico, of course, is concerned with genealogical
succession. His account of recurring cycles and of the evolution of man
from a primitive to a reflective state is both linear and sequential.
And yet, he can accede to this diachronic perception of history only from
a synchronic home base, that is from the cultural materials and their
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contextualisation in his own time. One of his basic axioms is that men
can only get to know the unknown by projecting onto it what they already
know. Thi sis an ai d to knowl edge, but al so a limitation, a 1ens, but
also a blinder or a filter. To minimize the filtering effect Vico
resorted to the lateral approach admired by Said, looking not only at the
common meaning of word, but looking behind it, or around it, or inside
it, to see what residual meanings there might be which accompany the word
and which might provide a glimpse at a former metaphorical or imagistic
meaning in a different context.
This emphasis on the lateral and the dispersed also belongs to deconstruction. Derrida's notions of the trace, the supplement, the grapheme,
etc., define language as a network of constantly displaced signifiers
that never manage to link up to specific signifieds but bear traces of
other signifiers. Language is never referential but "always already"
metaphor, a continuous substitution.
Space prevents a detailed analysis of the other points that Said derives
from Vico: 4) "A central interplay between beginning and repetition, or
between beginning and beginning again"; 5) "Language as rewriting, as
hi story condi tioned by repetiti on, as enci pherment and dissemi nation";
6) "Topics ••• that do not fall neatly into the categories of commentary, chronicle, or thematic tracings"; 7) "The beginning in writing as
inaugurating and subsequently maintaining another order of meaning from
previous or already existing writing."
What all these remai ni ng poi nts seem to have in common--anc1 what Vico,
Derrida, and Said all seem to have 1n common--1s that language starts as
writing, not as some kind of natural speech. The identification of
1anguage with writi ng, rather than with oral speech, is of course the
whole point of Derrida's Grammatology, which he posits in lieu of
phonology. Derrida's work ;s a sustained and rigorous critique of
western metaphysics, which he accuses of being "logocentric," based on
the affirmation of the Logos, a complex word which suggests truth, logic,
presence, origin--but also "word." Western discourse, Derrida claims,
from Plato to L~vi-Strauss, through Rousseau and DeSaussure, has mistakenly privileged oral speech over written language, treating writing as a
"scandal," an artificial and conventional, and hence deficient instrument
with which to convey oral speech, which is in turn perceived as more
natural, more pure, more innocent, more referential, more apt to express
the subject or indicate the object in a direct manner. Writing, on the
other hand, clearly relies on arbitrary symbols that stand for something
else.
Derrida points out, however, that all language is writing, a system of
arbitrary signifi ers standing for somethi ng el se. All 1 anguage is
metaphor, including oral speech whose signifiers are no more grounded
than grams or ciphers or letters. If Plato and Rousseau and DeSaussure
have chosen to express misgivings about writing but not about speech it
is because of their need to affirm a Logos, a center or presence, a
master sign, with which to endow their discourses and their lives with
meaning. Deconstruction dismantles this "logocentric" discourse from the
inside, showing what an elaborate, but false, construct it is.
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Surprisingly, Vico, who was a contemporary of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, one
of Derrida's main targets, also claimed that language is writing and that
it originated as writing:
[TJhe scholars • • • all took the origin of letters to be a
thing apart from that of 1anguages, though the two were by
natu re connected, as indeed, the schol ars ought have been
warned by the words 'grammar' and 'characters.' By the first,
because grammar is defined as 'the art of speaking' and letters
are [grammataJ, so that grammar should have been defined as the
art of writing, as it was by Aristotle, and as, in truth, it
was at birth, since ••• being mute at first, the nations all
spoke originally in writing. • •• Furthermore, had these
1etters been the shapes of articul ate sounds and not • •
arbitrary signs, they would, like the articulate sounds themselves, have been uniform in all nations. But, having abandoned all hope of learning the [proper] mode, the scholars have
not discovered that the first nations thought in poetic
characters, spoke in fables and wrote in hieroglyphics, which
should have constituted the principles, which by their nature
must be most certain, both of philosophy, whose concern is with
human ideas, and of philology, whose concern is with human
words. (233)
In commencing our argument, therefore, we lay down as OU!' first
principle the following philological axiom: that the Egyptians
asserted that in the whole previous duration of their world
three languages had been spoken, correspondent in number and
order to three ages which had elapsed in that world, the ages
of the gods, of the heroes and of men; and of these languages
they said that the first had been hieroglyphic or sacred or
divine, the second had been symbolic or in signs or heroic
coats-of arms, and the third had been alphabetic, in order that
the needs of daily life might be communicated among men distant
from one another. (234-23S)
To say that 1anguage began as hi erogl yphi cs is to say that it began as
metaphor, as a "standing for" that revealed its nature as arbitrary
signifier, as trace, or supplement, as a scandalous substitution that
suggested the presence of what it "stood for" only by revealing its
absence. It's this complex interplay between absence and presence, Vico
seems to say, which generates human language, human consciousness, and
human cu 1tu reo
Now, in pointing out this parallel between Vico and deconstruction
concerning the primacy of writing, I don't wish merely to praise Vico as
a precursor, or to accuse Derrida of an oversight with regard to Vico;
although, these observations do support the claims made by the American
philosopher Richard Rorty, among others, that Derrida and the Deconstructionists set up a straw man by insisting so stridently on the logocentric
nature of Western di scourse. Accordi ng to Rorty it has been several
centuries since Western thinkers seriously posited notions of truth or of
a "master sign." Indeed, Western culture had already deconstructed
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itself before Derrida offered to do it with such an unwarranted sense of
urgency. If this is so, Vico surely had a hand in this deconstruction.
But, to repeat, there's more at stake than putting Vico in the corner
with the deconstructionists. By juxtaposing Vico with Derrida and Said
new vistas are created in each of thei r texts. The paradoxes and
contradictions which are perhaps more di scernib1 e in Vico's text might
lead us to perceive similar configurations in Derrida's text which
otherwise would remain hidden. Furthermore, we might be led to perceive
that the expression of contradictions is the whole point, that what
they're all doing is continuing the game of bouncing absence and presence
off each other.
The lesson that Vico can teach us about deconstruction and language is
that ultimately the most important thing is not to determine what is at
the end (or the beginning) of a semiotic chain--absence or presence,
nothingness or divinity, matter or spirit. The most important thing may
well be to remain suspended between the two--to playoff absence against
presence. Whether we perceive God as a human projection dictated by
human fears and needs, or man as a creature formed in God's image--man's
consciousness is still suspended between the two extremes, floating on a
sea between the shores of affirmation and annihi1ation--and as the great
Italian poet, Giacomo Leopardi, said in the last verse of his wonderful
poem "L' infinito" (The Infinite): "E 11 naufragar m'~ dolce in questo
mare" (And I find it sweet to drown in this sea).
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